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The eﬀects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship
between the demand and the technological structure of the market.
This paper focuses on a model in which ﬁrms supply a homogeneous
product in two diﬀerent sizes. Information about consumers’ reserva-
tion prices is incomplete and the production technology is character-
ized by size economies.
Four equilibrium regions are identiﬁed depending on the relative in-
tensity of size economies with respect to consumers’ evaluation of a
second unit of the good. The desirability of non-linear pricing varies
across diﬀerent equilibrium regions.
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11 Introduction
Production technology plays an important role in determining the eﬀects
of non-linear pricing in imperfectly competitive settings. It is very well known
that the possibility of practicing non-linear pricing and its implementation
by a monopolist ﬁrm depend crucially on the characteristics of the market
demand, on the information available, and on the instruments the ﬁrm can
use to implement a discriminatory price strategy. As shown by Stole[16],
similar observations apply when the market structure is competitive although
additional strategic eﬀects have to be taken into account. The demand side,
however, is not the only factor determining the feasibility and the eﬀects
of non-linear pricing. This aspect is underlined by Ekelund[9]: he observes
that Jules Dupuit was already aware in 1849 of the strong impact that both
the preference structure and the technology available for production play in
inﬂuencing the possibilities of ﬁrms to price discriminate. Despite this, most
of the related theoretical literature does not emphasize the interrelationships
between the demand and the cost structure in determining ﬁrms’ pricing
strategies1.
The main contribution of this paper is to explicitly take into account the
interaction between the demand structure and the production technology
when ﬁrms are price discriminating via non-linear pricing.
Technological factors play an important role in regulated industries: nat-
ural monopolies and network utilities are typical examples. Another charac-
teristic of these industries is the asymmetric information often faced by the
regulatory agency. Non-linear pricing is a more eﬃcient device to regulate an
industry with those characteristics and the technological structure inﬂuences
the shape of the price schedule. This paper, however, focuses on purely proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrms in a unregulated sector. The relation between the eﬀects of
1The inﬂuential survey by Varian[19] largely assumes that ﬁrms produce at a constant
marginal cost, often normalized to zero. More recent literature reviews by Armstrong[1]
and Stole[17] share the same feature.
2quantity discounts and the technological structure of the market constitutes
an old topic in microeconomic theory. Quantity discounts have a positive
eﬀect on the proﬁts of a monopolist and hurt consumers; the eﬀects of this
practice are not as clear when ﬁrms are competing in an oligopolistic market.
Ireland[11]’s results suggest that non-linear pricing always hurts consumers
and welfare, unless size or scale economies are sensibly important. Using the
same model, however, Cheung-Wang[4] show that Ireland’s conclusion may
be too strong and there are cases in which ﬁrms practicing linear pricing
may restrict their output at consumers’ expenses. On the other hand, De
Meza[7] proves that in a diﬀerentiated Bertrand duopoly model non-linear
pricing may, instead, enhance consumers surplus. The debate on competi-
tion, technological structure and the eﬀects of non-linear pricing is then far
from settled.
The objective of this paper is tackle the above issues focusing on ﬁrms
competing ‘à la Cournot’. In the model, ﬁrms do not possess information
on consumers’ preferences but only on their distribution. The good is sup-
p l i e di np a c k e t so ft w od i ﬀerent sizes and ﬁrms’ enjoy size economies when
producing and distributing the two-unit packets2. Under speciﬁc conditions
on the distribution function, it is possible to get a closed form solution and
so analyze directly the results in terms of consumers served, output sup-
plied, consumers surplus, proﬁts and welfare. A further advantage of the
model presented this paper is that it makes the comparison of the properties
of equilibria under linear and non-linear pricing particularly easy. This is
in sharp contrast with more general models of non-linear pricing in which,
if the comparison is possible, requires more elaborate analysis3.M o r e o v e r ,
the analysis provided is directly comparable with the ones of Ireland[11] and
Cheung-Wang[4].
2Focusing on packets of two diﬀerent sizes only does not harm the generality of the
ﬁndings: the model is easily extended to ﬁrms supplying the good in m-sizes packets.
3A recent example of a general model from which is possible to carry out a comparison
of non-linear and linear pricing is Armstrong-Vickers[2].
3The ﬁndings of the paper are not just limited to the case of bundling
and size economies. First, a strikingly similar modelling approach has been
adopted to address a number of issues in the literature on non-linear pricing:
Deneckere-Mc Afee[8], for example, adopt a closely related speciﬁcation for
their analysis of damaged goods. Second, both the approach and the results
obtained are strongly connected to the literature on competitive quality sup-
ply. De Fraja[6] and more recently a series of paper by Johnson-Myatt ([12]-
[13]) analyze Cournot models in which ﬁrms are allowed to supply ‘product
lines’. A productive parallel can be drawn between their interpretation and
the size-related discounts analyzed in this paper: our results depend crucially
on size economies while theirs on the analogous concept of returns to quality
in supply.
The results obtained can be summarized as follows. Firstly, necessary
and suﬃcient conditions are provided for an equilibrium with non-linear pri-
cing to be well-behaved or to collapse to a non-discriminatory situation in
which ﬁrms provide the good only in packets of two units. An analogous res-
ult is obtained when ﬁrms practice linear price schedules. This allows us to
partition the parameter space: four types of equilibrium conﬁgurations with
diﬀerent properties under linear and non-linear pricing are devised. A par-
ticularly interesting result is that both consumers surplus and welfare may
be enhanced under non-linear pricing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and in-
troduces ﬁrms’ problem. Section 3 provides suﬃcient conditions under which
a well-behaved equilibrium under linear and non-linear pricing is obtained. A
direct consequence of the latter analysis is to provide a partition of the para-
meters’ space which allows to identify diﬀerent types of equilibria: in Section
4 those equilibria are described and analyzed by comparing the results under
non-linear and linear pricing. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results, draws
their implications and suggests future extensions. All proofs can be found in
Appendix A.
42 The Model
The model is based on Ireland[11] and it is modiﬁed in order to focus on
technological issues.
2.1 Supply
On the supply side there are n ﬁrms that produce a homogeneous good;
the good can be commercialized in packets of diﬀerent sizes: either one-unit
or two-units. Once deﬁned p1 t h ep r i c eo ft h es i n g l eu n i ta n dp2 the price
for the double packet, prices are linear if p2 =2 p1; otherwise prices are
non-linear. Assuming consumers are rational, it is clear that under these
assumptions, two-units packets are attractive to consumers’ eyes if and only
if p2 ≤ 2p1.
Technology is characterized by size economies: it displays unit cost sav-
ings in producing the two-unit packet with respect to the single unit packet.
This property represents the main diﬀerence with the model in Ireland[11]
and Cheung-Wang[4] but it is crucial for the results described in the rest of
the paper.
2.1.1 The Cost Structure and Size Economies
The cost structure in Ireland’s model is fairly simple: it is assumed that
the total cost is described by the following relation
C(q,x1,x 2,Q q)=
(
cD 1(x1,x 2,Q 1) if q =1
2cD 2(x1,x 2,Q 2) if q =2
in which q represents the size, xq the marginal consumers, indiﬀerent between
buying size q or q − 1 packet, Dq the demand faced by the ﬁrm for the size
q while Qq the demand for the size q faced by the n − 1 rival ﬁrms, i.e. the
residual demand. The hypothesis is that in producing the two-units packets
5the unit cost is constant and double of the unit cost c of producing a single
package.
In Ireland’s model the marginal and average cost are identical and con-
stant with respect to both size and quantity. It is reasonable, in a number of
situations, to assume that average cost is declining in the size of the product
sold. An intuitive way of justifying this assumption is in relation to the
packaging and selling costs aﬀorded by the ﬁrms to take the product to the
market. It can be thought then that the total cost is a function of three
inputs:
TC = wl + rk + Pq
in which l represents labor and w is its given price, k is capital whose price
is r and the size-dependent cost of packaging devices is denoted by Pq.I ti s
clear that the packaging cost component depends on size q and it is assumed
that Pq/q is weakly decreasing in q,i . e . P1 ≥ P2/2.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t h e
marginal and average costs of production are still constant with respect to
demanded quantity, but they decline with size q. The previous discussion
allows us to state Assumption 1:




cD 1(x1,x 2,Q 1) if q =1
2θcD2(x1,x 2,Q 2) if q =2
in which θ ∈ [1/2,1].
The parameter θ h a sa ni n t u i t i v ei n t e r p r e t a t i o n :i tc a nb et h o u g h ta sa




Two limiting cases are encompassed in this description: if P2 is exactly the
double of P1 the model is the same one as in Ireland while if the cost P is
ﬁxed and does not depend on the size of the packet, i.e. when P1 = P2,t h e
value of θ is equal to 1/2.
62.2 Demand
Consumers are characterized by a type parameter x that expresses their
willingness to pay for the ﬁrst unit of good. Crucial for the results of the
model is the distribution function of willingness to pay of customers, f(x)
with x ∈ [0,1]. T h i si sa s s u m e dt ob ec o n t i n u o u sa n dt w i c ed i ﬀerentiable
in x. The cumulative distribution F(x) expresses the fraction of customers
with a willingness to pay equal or lower than x. Each consumer can demand
either the one unit packet or the two units packet or nothing.





0 if q =0
x − E(q) if q =1
bx − E(q) if q =2
in which x ∈ [0,1], q =0 ,1,2 are the units of product bought, E(q) is
the expenditure necessary to buy the desired packet. Marginal utility is
decreasing: the second unit provides a lower utility to the consumer. This is
captured by the parameter b, about which the following is assumed:
Assumption 2 The marginal decrease of utility in consuming a second unit
of the good is the same across all consumers so that the willingness to pay
for the second unit in the package is (b − 1)x, b ∈ [1,2].
All consumers aim to maximize their utility, i.e. choose q such that:
max{0,x− p1,b x− p2}
is selected.
The marginal consumers, given a set of prices (p1,p 2)c a nb ei d e n t i ﬁed
to construct the demand schedule. Agents of type x1 are indiﬀerent between
buying nothing or one unit if:
x1 − p1 =0⇔ x1 = p1
7This condition identiﬁes x1, the consumers’ type for which the individual
rationality constraint is binding. Customers of type x2 are indiﬀerent between
one unit or two units if:





identifying the type for which the upper incentive compatibility constraint is
binding.





0 if 0 <x<x 1
1 if x1 <x<x 2
2 if x2 <x<1





0 if 0 <x<x 1
F(x2) − F(x1) − Q1 if x1 <x<x 2
1 − F(x2) − Q2 if x2 <x<1
2.3 Non-Linear Pricing
It is possible now to state the ﬁrms’ problem. The assumption of quantity
setting oligopoly implies, in this context, that each ﬁrm chooses the amount
of packets of the two diﬀerent sizes to be produced. This is equivalent to
setting total production, while the market establishes the equilibrium price,
as determined by the demand schedule. All of this implies that ﬁrm’s choice
of quantities is equivalent to choosing the marginal consumers x1 and x2,a s
deﬁned above4.
4Oren-Smith-Wilson[14] and Wilson[20] show that it is equivalent to assume that ﬁrms’
choice variable is quantity or the consumer’s type.
8Suppose further, consistent with the idea of Cournot competition, that
ﬁrms act as monopolists on their segments of residual demand. Deﬁne Q1
and Q2 the quantities supplied by the (n−1) rival ﬁrms for the one unit and
two units package respectively.
The proﬁt function is deﬁned by:
πi =[ F(x2) − F(x1) − Q1](p1 − c)+[ 1− F(x2) − Q2](p2 − 2θc)
From the constraints derived in Section 2.2 follows that p1 = x1 and p2 =
(b − 1)x2 + x1,t h i sc a nb ew r i t t e na s :
πi =[ F(x2) − F(x1) − Q1](x1 − c)+[ 1− F(x2) − Q2][(b − 1)x2 + x1 − 2θc]
The ﬁrst order conditions for a maximum are obtained imposing:
∂πi
∂x1
=[ F(x2) − F(x1) − Q1] − f(x1)(x1 − c)+[ 1− F(x2) − Q2]=0
∂πi
∂x2
= f(x2)(x1 − c)+( b − 1)[1 − F(x2) − Q2] − f(x2)[(b − 1)x2 + x1 − 2θc]=0
Considerations on the suﬃciency conditions for a maximum in the ﬁrms
problem and their relation with the distribution function are delayed until
Section 3.
Imposing that the equilibrium decisions of ﬁrms are symmetric5,t h eﬁrst






− f(x1)(x1 − c)=0 (1)
∂πi
∂x2
=( b − 1)
1 − F(x2)
n
− f(x2)[(b − 1)x2 − (2θ − 1)c]=0 (2)
T h el a s tt w oe q u a t i o n sd e ﬁne implicitly and independently x∗
1 and x∗
2, i.e.
the ﬁrms’ optimal choices when price discrimination is allowed.
5Further discussion about symmetry is provided in the concluding section.
92.4 Linear Pricing
Suppose that, for any reason, ﬁrms are constrained to a linear price
schedule the restriction p2 =2 p1 h a st ob ei m p o s e d .T h i si m p l i e s :
p2 − p1 = p1 ⇒ x2 = p1/(b − 1) and x1 =( b − 1)x2




















or alternatively, using the constraint stated above, as:
πi =[ ( b−1)x2−c][F(x2)−F((b−1)x2)−Q1]+2[(b−1)x2−θc][1−F(x2)−Q2]
Maximizing with respect to x2 yields the following ﬁrst order condition:
−(b − 1)f((b − 1)x2)[(b − 1)x2 − c] − f(x2)[(b − 1)x2 − (2θ − 1)c]+
+(b − 1)[2 − F(x2) − F((b − 1)x2) − Q]=0
in which Q = Q1 + Q2 represents the units supplied by the other (n − 1)
ﬁrms. By imposing symmetry the above equation can be written as:
−(b − 1)f((b − 1)x2)[(b − 1)x2 − c] − f(x2)[(b − 1)x2 − (2θ − 1)c]+
+(b − 1)
2 − F(x2) − F((b − 1)x2)
n
=0 (3)
The second order conditions for this problem are discussed in the next section.
The solution of this equation along with the condition x1 =( b − 1)x2 are
denoted by x0
1 and x0
2 and represent the ﬁrms’ optimal choices under linear
pricing.
10Finally it is important to notice the relationship between the ﬁrst order
conditions of the two problems. First, express the ﬁrst order conditions (1),




The ﬁrst order conditions, then, are linked by the following relation:
(b − 1)FOC NLP1[(b − 1)x]+FOC NLP2(x)=FOC LP(x) (4)
This result is of crucial importance to prove the main properties of the non-
linear and linear pricing equilibrium outcomes.
3I d e n t i ﬁcation of Equilibria
3.1 A Remark on Suﬃcient Conditions for Maximum
Proﬁts
Suﬃcient conditions for a maximum in the ﬁrms’ optimization problem
deserve careful discussion since they are strictly related to the properties of
the distribution function. The analysis of Cheung-Wang[4] witnesses the im-
portance of this aspect: in the context of the original Ireland model, a deeper
analysis of the second order conditions allows one to highlight more general
insights on non-linear pricing.
Consider ﬁrst the non-linear pricing equilibrium. Recall that the ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to x1 and x2 are independent, so that the elements
of the minor diagonal of the Hessian matrix are zero. The second order suﬃ-

















0(x2)[(b − 1)x2 − (2θ − 1)c] ≤ 0 (6)
which must be satisﬁed at a maximum point (x∗
1,x ∗
2).D e ﬁne R∗(x)=

























On the other hand, when ﬁrms practice linear pricing, the suﬃcient condition















0((b − 1)x2) ≤ 0
to be satisﬁed at x0
2.
As for ﬁrst order conditions, there is a relationship between second order
conditions and it can be expressed as:
(b − 1)
2SOCNLP1[(b − 1)x]+SOCNLP2(x)=SOCLP(x)
having deﬁned the second order conditions (5), (6) and (7) as functions of x.
123.2 Non-Linear Pricing Equilibrium
When conditions (5)-(6) hold, then a non-linear pricing equilibrium exists,
it is unique and it is described by (1)-(2). As existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium are guaranteed, the focus is now on the economic properties of
the equilibrium.







Proposition 1 establishes when this is the case. Before that, however, it




















(2 − b)(b − 1)
2
The main result of this section can be now stated.
Proposition 1 Suppose θ ≥ ϑ(b), then a non-linear pricing equilibrium in
which c<x ∗
1 <x ∗
2 < 1 is the outcome of ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problem.




The proposition provides suﬃcient conditions on the parameters to re-
gister a well-behaved equilibrium. In that case both one and two unit packets
are supplied, which is exactly the case when the inequality θ ≥ ϑ(b) holds.
However, the proposition is also providing a suﬃcient condition under which
a corner solution is found: if θ ≤ ψ(b),t h e na l lﬁrms will supply only two-unit
packets and not the one-unit ones.
The intuition for the result in Proposition 1 is that ﬁrms in equilibrium
choose to supply both sizes packets (one and two units) when the eﬀect of
13size economies (θ) is not too intense relative to the consumers’ evaluation of
as e c o n du n i to fp r o d u c t( b). In other words, when the cost savings related
to size economies are relatively important, ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to supply
only two-units packets.
The parameter space (bOθ) results then split into several areas by the re-
lations derived: the properties of the equilibrium are diﬀerent for diﬀerent
combinations of parameters. It is not possible however to completely identify
equilibria. For example, it is ap r i o r inot possible to predict what character-
istics the equilibria will have when the parameters satisfy6:
ψ(b) <θ<ϑ (b)
3.3 Linear Pricing Equilibrium
When (7) holds, then a linear pricing equilibrium exists, it is unique
and it is described by (3) and x0
1 =( b − 1)x0
2. Once established existence
and uniqueness, turn once more to the economic properties of equilibria. A






As ﬁrstly pointed out by Cheung-Wang[4] this needs not always to be the
case and this observation applies to the extended model as well. Deﬁne the
following expression as:
φ(b)=
nc(b − 1)f(b − 1) + (b − 1)2f(b − 1)[1 − F(b − 1)]+
2f(1){nc +( b − 1)[1 − F(b − 1)]}
−n[(b − 1)2f(b − 1) − F(1)]




The relevance of φ(b) will become clear stating the main result of this section:
6It is however possible to fully describe the equilibria in this region once speciﬁed a
functional form for the demand and the values of parameters, as we do in Section 4.
14Proposition 2 Suppose θ>φ (b), then the linear pricing equilibrium is char-
acterized by c<x 0
1 <x 0
2 < 1.I fθ ≤ φ(b), then the linear pricing equilibrium
is characterized by c<x 00
1 <x 00
2 =1 .
Proposition 2 states that a well behaved equilibrium in which ﬁrms supply
both one and two unit packets is found if θ>φ (b) while only one-unit packets
c a nb ef o u n do nt h em a r k e ti fθ ≤ φ(b).
The following re-formulation of φ(b) in terms of the marginal cost allows
a more intuitive interpretation of the result of Proposition 27:
c<c
∗ =
(b − 1)2f(b − 1) − f(1)
(b − 1)f(b − 1) − (2θ − 1)f(1)
−
(b − 1)[1 − F(b − 1)]
n
When ﬁrms choose linear pricing, there exist a value c∗ of the marginal cost
over which the ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce and sell two units
packets.
The results obtained identify two regions in which the parameters space
is split: (
if θ ≤ φ(b): c ≥ c∗ ⇒ q =1only
if θ>φ (b): c<c ∗ ⇒ q =1 , 2
The intuition for the results presented is clear using the latest interpretation
of φ(b): under linear pricing a threshold value for the unit cost exists below
which ﬁrms ﬁnd optimal to supply both one and two unit packets and above
which only one unit packets are supplied.
4 Analysis of the Model
A uniform distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, x, is assumed
to provide a complete analysis of the model. The density and distribution
function of the willingness to pay for a unit of product, x,a r ed e ﬁned as:
f(x)=1 ,F (x)=x ∀x ∈ [0,1]
7An analogous result is obtained by Cheung-Wang[4] in the original model.





0 if 0 <x<x 1
x2 − x1 − Q1 if x1 <x<x 2
1 − x2 − Q2 if x2 <x<1
Even though this is a fairly ‘special’ case, as underlined by Cheung-Wang[4],
it allows us to illustrate the main features of the model.
Using these information, the condition θ R φ(b) in Section 3.3 can be
expressed as:
θ R
nc(b − 1) + (b − 1)2(2 − b)+nb(2 − b)




As Figure 1 witnesses for plausible combinations of c and n,t h ef u n c t i o n
θ = φ(b) is downward sloping.
Even simpler is the case of non-linear pricing. The relation θ ≥ ϑ(b) becomes
under a uniform distribution
θ ≥
b2 − 4b + bc − 2c +2
2(cb − 2c − 1)
The relation θ ≤ ψ(b) does not change and it is clearly an increasing function
of b.
Bringing together the results of Proposition 1 for non-linear pricing and
of Proposition 2 for linear pricing in the context of uniformly distributed con-
sumers’ types, gives rise to the partition of the parameters’ space illustrated
in Table 1.
Table 1. Parameters and Types of Equilibria
θ ≤ φ(b) θ>φ (b)
θ ≥ ϑ(b) Type 1 Type 2
θ ≤ ψ(b) Type 3 Type 4
Figure 1 illustrates the partition of the parameters’ space bOθfor n =3
and c =0 .25.W e d e ﬁne Type 1 equilibria as the region of the parameters
16Figure 1: Equilibrium Regions for n =3and c =0 .25.
space characterized by ﬁrms supplying both packets under non-linear pricing
and restricting to single unit size packets when linear pricing is enforced.
Graphically, it is the north-western part of Figure 1. Type 2 equilibria are
characterized by both packets being supplied under both non-linear and lin-
ear pricing regimes. It is the region in the north-east of Figure 1. Type
3 equilibria are remarkable in that no type of price discrimination occurs:
either only the two unit packets or only the one unit packets are supplied
under the diﬀerent regimes. These equilibria can be identiﬁed in the south-
eastern part of Figure 1. Type 4 equilibria are characterized by ﬁrms focusing
only on the supply of the two-unit packets if non-linear pricing is allowed and
on both sizes’ packets under non-linear pricing. This equilibria take place for
the combinations of parameters in the eastern part of Figure 1. Finally, it
can be noticed the existence of a ‘cone’ of ‘ap r i o r i’n o ni d e n t i ﬁable equilibria
between the yellow (ϑ(b)) and the green (ψ(b)) schedules.
Last but not least, under this speciﬁcation the second order conditions
for a maximum are strictly veriﬁed. The description and the analysis of the
four types of equilibria follows.
174 . 1 T y p e1E q u i l i b r i a( àl aC h e u n g - W a n g )
The ﬁrst equilibrium conﬁguration is characterized by both packets sup-
plied under non-linear pricing (as θ ≥ ϑ(b)) and only the one-unit packets
under linear pricing (as θ ≤ φ(b)): it constitutes the generalization of Type
1 equilibrium of Cheung-Wang[4]. The equilibrium is described by the fol-
lowing tables.
Table 2 reports the equilibrium values when ﬁrms practice non-linear pricing:

















Table 3 reports the equilibrium variables in case linear pricing are chosen
by all ﬁrms:















The comparison of equilibrium expressions allows to establish the results
reported below:
Proposition 3 Assuming the demand function is linear, in Type 1 equi-
librium: (i) prices for the one-unit packets are the same under linear and
non-linear pricing; (ii) total output, proﬁts, consumer’s surplus and total
welfare are larger under non-linear pricing.
184 . 2 T y p e2E q u i l i b r i a( àl aI r e l a n d )
This case is a generalization of Ireland’s benchmark: his analysis is en-
compassed as a special case θ =1 . Under both pricing regimes all ﬁrms
supply both the one and the two unit packets (as both θ ≥ ϑ(b) and θ>φ (b)
hold). This allows an important comparison with the results of Ireland[11]
and a deeper analysis of the role played by size economies in this particular
model and, more generally, with respect to the practice of non-linear pricing.
The equilibrium expressions for the non-linear and the linear pricing case are
summarized in the following tables:








































The comparison of the equilibrium expressions allows to join the following
conclusions:
Proposition 4 In Type 2 equilibrium with linear demand: (i) a larger share
of customers is served with one-unit packets under linear pricing while under
19non-linear pricing a larger share of two-unit packets is supplied; (ii) the total
output is the same under both pricing regimes; (iii) ﬁrms’ proﬁts are always
larger under non-linear pricing.
Two observations about the above results are in order. First, since the
total output is constant in both equilibria, the output of each ﬁrm should









it can be noticed that not only the two components must have opposite signs
[which was known from Point (i)] but the increase in the share of consumers
served with one-unit packets under linear prices has to be twice as big as
the decrease in the share of consumers buying two-units packets once ﬁrms
switch from non-linear to linear pricing.
Second, the results of Ireland’s original model about economy’s total output
and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are robust and hold in the case production displays size
economies: output is constant and proﬁts are always higher under non-linear
pricing. This is not irrelevant: the results of Ireland[11] show that non-linear
pricing is welfare dominated. This is beacause, in the linear demand case,
non-linear pricing does not imply an output expansion eﬀect.
There are no immediate analytical conclusions that can be derived for
what regards the comparison between consumers’ surplus and social welfare
under non-linear and linear pricing. It is possible, however, to get insights
from simulation evidence. Consider ﬁrst the diﬀerential between consumers’




[b − 2+2 cn(θ − 1)][(2 − b)(1 + 2n)+2 cn(θ − 1)]
2b(n +1 ) 2
This expression ap r i o r ican not be signed. Fixing the values of n and c at
plausible levels, though, the relation ∆CS can be interpreted as a function
of θ and b. Figure 2 illustrates the point: the chosen parameters are n =3
and c =0 .25.
20Figure 2: Consumers’ Surplus Diﬀerential in Type 2 Equilibrium.
Only negative values of the function are represented in the graph while
positive combinations are left blank. Inspection of the relevant region, the
eastern, conﬁrms that the function is negative for all combinations of para-
meters. This leads to the following remark:
Remark 1 Ireland’s conclusion that consumers are better-oﬀ if non-linear
prices are prohibited is robust to the extension of the model allowing for size
economies.
The same, though, does not hold for social welfare: as Figure 3 makes
clear, the gains in proﬁts under non-linear pricing more than compensate the
losses suﬀered by consumers and ∆W results to be positive in the relevant
region deﬁning Type 2 equilibria.
The intuition for this result, that is in contrast with Ireland’s conclusions,
is that non-linear pricing imposes no restrictions on ﬁrms, allowing them to
be more ﬂexible and eﬀective in taking advantage of the cost savings deriving
from size economies.
Remark 2 In presence of size economies on the supply side, the higher ﬂex-
ibility allowed by non-linear pricing implies a gain in eﬃciency which more
21Figure 3: Social Welfare Diﬀerential in Type 2 Equilibria.
than oﬀset the losses imposed on consumers.
4.3 Type 3 Equilibria
This case is original and peculiar at the same time: in both linear and
non-linear pricing, under the given combinations of the relevant parameters,
ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to supply both packets. In a sense, no price
discrimination exists in equilibrium under either one price regime or the
other; the shape of the equilibrium is nevertheless determined by the degree
of price freedom ﬁrms enjoy
Only two-units packets are on the market under non-linear pricing as
θ ≤ ψ(b) and as the following table describing this equilibrium makes clear:















22whereas, only one-unit packets are oﬀered under linear pricing as θ ≤ φ(b)
and as it can be seen in the table below.















By comparing the equilibrium expressions, the following results are ob-
tained:
Proposition 5 Assuming the demand function is linear, in Type 3 equi-
librium: (i) the share of consumers served with two units under non-linear
pricing is larger than the share supplied with one unit packets under linear
pricing; (ii) total output is larger under non-linear pricing.
Unfortunately, no conclusive results are available with respect to proﬁts,
consumers’ surplus and total welfare. Using again the strategy of ﬁxing
plausible values of the parameters c and n, a few hints on the comparison
between non-linear and linear prices can be given.
Figure 4 represents ∆π, the diﬀerential between proﬁts under non-linear and
linear pricing, for plausible combinations of parameters. The relevant region
for this case is the southern part: for n =3the function is mainly positive,
apart for the half moon shaped region in the south-eastern part of the ﬁgure,
representing rather extreme combinations of parameters. The negative area
expands as n increases8: a general conclusion, then, can not be reached.
The uncertainty over the proﬁte ﬀects of non-linear pricing however allows
to highlight a very interesting mechanism related to the oligopolistic nature
8The results of simulations for diﬀerent values of n and c a r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t
from the author.
23Figure 4: ProﬁtD i ﬀerential in Type 3 Equilibria.
of the model. The model encompasses a monopolistic market structure. The
only proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm should always be able to do at least as well using
non-linear pricing: that strategy, in fact, encompasses linear pricing in the
limit. This needs not to be the case as the number of ﬁrms increases. The
reason why non-linear pricing may be dominated by linear pricing is related
to very last nature of ﬁrms’ maximizand function: according to Bergstrom-
Varian[3] this is a combination of aggregate consumer surplus and aggregate
proﬁts. Following that approach, Ireland[11] shows that the function ﬁrms
maximize, G(Y ) c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
G(Y )=
(n − 1)CS + nπ
n
(8)
This speciﬁcation, mutatis mutandis9, is robust to the extended version of
the model considered here. Ireland[11] insight is that, as G(Y ) is maximized
freely in a non-linear pricing equilibrium and G(Y ) is maximized under con-
straints in the linear pricing equilibrium, then necessarily needs the following
9The expressions of aggregate consumers surplus and proﬁta r ed i ﬀerent in this case:
this does not aﬀect the validity of the analysis.





assuming the constraint is strictly binding. As the consumer surplus is always
higher in a linear pricing equilibrium, equation (8) implies that proﬁtm u s t
be higher in the non-linear pricing one. As shown by Figure 5, in the case
analyzed here consumers surplus is always higher in a non-linear pricing
equilibrium, so the relation between proﬁts π∗ and π0 can go either way,
without this fact compromising the logical consistency of the model.
The intuition behind this result is that strategic interaction may determ-
ine all ﬁrms ending up in a sub-optimal outcome: this is due to the externality
they exercise on each other when maximizing their proﬁts.
In conclusion, passing from a linear to a non-linear pricing equilibrium,
the positive eﬀects for the consumers more than oﬀset the negative eﬀects,
if any, on proﬁts. Simulations as in Figure 5 and 6 highlight the positive
eﬀect of non-linear pricing on consumers’ surplus and welfare. The latter
result is clearly driven by the expansion in total output guaranteed by price
25Figure 6: Social Welfare Diﬀerential in Type 3 Equilibria.
discrimination.
This result can be contrasted with the received literature: while output
expansion under non-linear pricing is often achieved by expanding the share
of customers served, in this case output increases despite ﬁrms are serving
an identical share of demand under both regimes. To summarize:
Remark 3 In Type 3 equilibria output is expanded under non-linear pricing
even maintaining constant the share of consumers served. This has positive
eﬀects for both consumers and welfare.
4.4 Type 4 Equilibria
In this situation ﬁrms supply only two-unit packets under non-linear
pricing since the condition θ ≤ ψ(b) holds. Under linear pricing, nevertheless
both one and two-unit packets are supplied as the relation θ>φ (b) is veriﬁed.
T h ea n a l y s i so ft h i st y p eo fe q u i l i b r i u mi so r i g i n a ls i n c et h eo u t c o m e sa r i s i n g
are characteristic only of the size economies setting.
26The expressions characterizing the symmetric non-cooperative Cournot
equilibrium under non-linear pricing are summarized in the following table:















The symmetric equilibrium when linear prices are practiced is character-
ized by the expressions reported in Table 9:























The analysis of the equilibrium expressions leads to the following results:
Proposition 6 In Type 4 equilibrium with linear demand: (i) a larger share
of customers is served with two-unit packets under non-linear pricing than
under linear; (ii) total output is larger under non-linear pricing; (iii) the
price of two unit-packets is higher under non-linear pricing; (iv) proﬁts are
larger under non-linear pricing than that under the linear pricing scheme.
The most striking feature of this equilibrium situation is that, despite the
fact that ﬁrms supply both the one and two unit packets under linear-pricing,
27Figure 7: Consumers’ Surplus Diﬀerential in Type 4 Equilibria.
total output is larger under non-linear pricing: this is due to the fact that a
larger share of two-unit packets is supplied under non-linear pricing and this
eﬀect is not compensated by the one-unit packets that are oﬀered only under
linear pricing.
Furthermore, the price of two-unit packets under linear pricing is at most
as big as the one registered under non-linear pricing: this, in turn, implies
that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are greater in the latter situation. This is an important
result that can be interpreted as follows: when size economies are so intense
that ﬁrms ﬁnd it convenient to produce only two-unit packets, the cost sav-
ings allow to serve a larger share of consumers, which also results to be more
proﬁtable than serving both sizes under linear pricing.
No deﬁnitive results can be obtained on consumers’ surplus and total
welfare, but some considerations can be drawn by comparing the equilibrium
expressions. Considering again the consumers’ surplus diﬀerential between
non-linear and linear pricing, Figure 7 displays the results for c =0 .25 and
n =3 . The function ∆CS is positive for the relevant combinations of θ and
b, the south-western region in the picture.
28Figure 8: Social Welfare Diﬀerential in Type 4 Equilibria.
As a result, geometrical considerations seem to suggest not only that
non-linear prices can leave consumers better-oﬀ but that this is a very likely
case. If this is the case, a non-linear pricing equilibrium Pareto-dominates
the linear pricing one. This is witnessed by Figure 8 that reports the graph
of ∆W = W∗∗ − W0 for the same values of n and c: the function is clearly
positive in the relevant region.
The following remark summarizes the results regarding these equilibria:
Remark 4 Simulations evidence suggests that total welfare is higher when
switching from linear to non-linear pricing. For the relevant combinations
of parameters consumers are better-oﬀ, implying that non-linear pricing is
Pareto-superior to linear pricing.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has provided two main contributions. First, it tackled the
issue of size economies in the context of non-linear pricing within a model
29of oligopoly. The relation between the welfare eﬀects of second degree price
discrimination and size or scale economies on the supply side is a debated
topic in the literature. The paper provides an inquiry on the relationship
between the demand and the cost structure of the market. Second, condi-
tions under which ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to supply packets of diﬀerent size
in equilibrium, both under non-linear and linear pricing, are identiﬁed. The
main result can be summarized as follows: the number of packets of product
supplied in equilibrium depends on the relative intensity of size economies,
both under non-linear and linear pricing.
Non-linear pricing in presence of a technology characterized by size eco-
nomies is likely to be welfare enhancing. However, not only non-linear pricing
can be socially preferred to linear pricing, cases in which non-linear pricing is
Pareto-superior to linear pricing are devised10. Generalizing Cheung-Wang[4]
ﬁndings this is the case of Type 1 equilibria11; evidence from simulations sug-
gests that this is a concrete possibility also in Type 3 and Type 4 equilibria.
The main caveat of the analysis is, then, that a policy prescription to
forbid ﬁrms to practice non-linear pricing needs a careful qualiﬁcation. The
relevant features which should be taken into account in evaluating the merits
of non-linear pricing as a market practice are: 1) the possibility of serving
under non-linear pricing shares of customers that otherwise would be ex-
cluded from the market; 2) the technological structure of the ﬁr m sa c t i v ei n
the sector, in order to assess the relation between the industry’s technology
and the impact of non-linear pricing on social welfare.
The analysis can be further extended in a number of ways. The model
easily and readily extends to the case in which the packets supplied is gen-
erically m. Generality was traded-oﬀ t ol e a v es p a c et ot h em o r ei n t u i t i v e
two-packets case.
Less tractable is the analysis of asymmetries between ﬁrms in this model.
10Pareto-superiority in this context is used meaning that both ﬁrms and customers are
better-oﬀ.
11A further generalization of this result can be found in Appendix B.
30There are several interesting issues when dealing with asymmetric settings.
One of this is: what happens if one of the ﬁr m si sm o r ee ﬃcient than the
rivals in taking advantage of size economies? Even more interesting, perhaps,
is the analysis of the eﬀect of an asymmetric choice of strategies. Suppose
the market is a duopoly and ﬁrms are free to choose their pricing policy.
What would be the outcome in the case of one ﬁrm practicing non-linear
pricing and the other adopting a linear price schedules? This exercise would
allow one to characterize completely the game faced by ﬁrms. In several duo-
polistic contexts, the ability to price-discriminate is privately proﬁtable but
leads in equilibrium to a less preferred outcome12. Despite the evaluation of
the conditions under which ﬁr m sf a c es u c hag a m em a yb ei m p o r t a n t ,i ti s
not technically immediate to achieve. Two further possible extensions are
worth being mentioned. First, a comparison of the results with a setting in
which ﬁrms compete àl aB e r t r a n dmay be of interest. Moreover, the ana-
lysis can be extended to the case of production technology characterized by
negative returns or the more extreme case of ‘damaged goods’.
A ﬁnal word deserves the quality interpretation that can be given to the
model. If the good is supplied in diﬀerent qualities, instead of packets, sev-
eral real-world economic situations can be interpreted through this model.
A related paper[15] uses a similar approach to shed light on the regulation
of broadband internet and network neutrality regulation. Moreover, the ap-
proach of this paper have many common features with the recent theoretical
analysis of vertical quality diﬀerentiation: a productive parallel between these
streams of literature may improve knowledge on both topics.
12Thisse-Vives[18] ﬁnd this result in a spatial context, Fudenberg-Tirole[10] in the case
of dynamic pricing and Corts[5] with respect to third-degree price discrimination are a few
important examples.
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33A Proof of Propositions 1-6
This appendix contains the proofs of Proposition 1 to Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 1 It is ﬁrstly established that ﬁrms do not price




(b−1) notice that x∗
1
and x∗
2 are deﬁned respectively by FOCNLP1(x)=0and FOC NLP2(x)=0 .
If second order conditions (5)-(6) are met, (1)-(2) are also monotonically de-
creasing in x.N o w ,s i n c eFOC NLP1(c)=
1−F(c)






n > 0, the claim is veriﬁed.
It is then to be proved that if θ ≥ ϑ(b) then x∗
1 <x ∗
2, consider the function:
Ω(x)=FOC NLP2(x) − FOC NLP1(x)
for a generic, given x.N o t i c eﬁr s tt h a tb ya s s u m p t i o n sa n db y( 5 )-( 6 ) ,b o t h
FOCNLP1(x) and FOC NLP2(x) are continuous and weakly decreasing in x.
Moreover, it can be shown that FOC NLP1(x) is decreasing at a higher rate
than FOCNLP2(x);h a v i n gd e ﬁned Ξ(x)=SOCNLP2(x) − SOCNLP1(x) it is
veriﬁed that: Ξ(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [0,1].
By algebraic manipulations, it is found that Ω(x)|x=2θ−1
b−1 c ≥ 0 ⇔ θ ≥ ϑ(b).
As FOCNLP1(x) is decreasing at a faster rate, this is suﬃcient to ensure that




It can also be derived that: Ω(x)|x=1 ≤ 0 ⇔ θ ≤ ψ(b).T h i s a s u ﬃcient
condition to ensure that the equilibrium collapses to x∗∗
1 ≡ x∗∗
2 Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2The ﬁrst inequality (c<x 0
1 )i ss h o w e dt oh o l d
by checking that FOC LP[c/(b − 1)] > 0 and noticing that also FOC LP(x)
is monotonically decreasing in x. The second inequality (x0
1 <x 0
2)is veriﬁed
by deﬁnition. To see that the last inequality holds notice that x0
2 < 1 if and
34only if FOC LP(1) < 0 which requires:




[1 − F(b − 1)] < 0
This inequality can be expressed as a relation between θ and b:
θ>
nc(b − 1)f(b − 1) + (b − 1)2f(b − 1)[1 − F(b − 1)]+
2f(1){nc +( b − 1)[1 − F(b − 1)]}
−n[(b − 1)2f(b − 1) − F(1)]






2 ≡ 1 in case θ ≤ φ(b) Q.E.D.







1, the result is immediately proven. Turning to point (ii), x∗
1 =
x00
1 implies that the same share of consumers is served under both pricing
regimes. It should be noticed under non-linear pricing, a share 1 − x∗
2 of
customers consumes the two-units packet then, in equilibrium, the output
must be higher under non-linear pricing. As p∗
1 = p00
1 and the total output is
higher, proﬁts must be higher under non-linear pricing. This is conﬁrmed by
algebraical comparison of π∗
i and π00
i. A similar result is obtained by directly
comparing the consumers’ surplus in the two situations. The result regarding
total welfare then follows by deﬁnition. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4Point (i) descends from direct comparisons
of the equilibrium expressions for the choice variables. First of all, ∆x2 =
x∗
2 − x0
2 ≤ 0 and is equal zero only in the extreme case b =1 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,
once again by direct comparison, it is obtained ∆x1 = x∗
1 −x0
1 > 0 under the
assumptions made on the parameters. These results imply that the share of




2 ≥ 1 − x
0
2











P o i n t( i i )i si m m e d i a t eb yl o o k i n ga tQ∗ and Q0. Point (iii) comes from
observing that ∆πi = π∗
i − π0
i > 0 for all the combinations of the relevant
parameters. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 Since, by direct comparison, x00
1 ≥ x∗∗
2 it is
immediate that both Point (i) and (ii) are veriﬁed. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6Point (i) follows by direct comparison: ∆x2 =
x∗∗
2 − x0
2 ≤ 0 and it is equal to zero only in the special case b =2and θ =1 .
F r o mt h i s ,i ti si m m e d i a t et os e et h a t1 − x∗∗
2 is larger than 1 − x0
2.
Direct comparison and the restriction θ ≤ ψ(b) permit to show that ∆Q =
Q∗∗ − Q0 ≥ 0 for all the feasible combinations of the parameters, so that
the output under non-linear pricing results larger or at least equal to the one
under linear prices. Point (iii) is proved by showing, through simple algebraic
manipulations, that ∆p2 = p∗∗
2 − p0
2 > 0. Point (iv) is derived by observing




2 represent the contribution of
one- and two-units packets, respectively, to the total output; furthermore,
since p0
2 − 2θc =2 ( p0
1 − θc) >p 1 − c for all θ ∈ [0,1) then, a fortiori,
p∗∗
2 −2θc > p0















which, by dividing by n, gives the wanted result for the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Q.E.D.
36B Type 1 Equilibrium: A General Result
The results stated in Proposition 3 are just a corollary of Proposition 7,
which addresses the general case. As illustrated in what follows these results
imply that if the parameters of demand and cost function are such that under
linear pricing it is optimal to supply only one-unit packets, then ﬁrms have
proﬁt advantages to practice non-linear prices. Furthermore this also drives
to a Pareto-superior equilibrium: both ﬁrms and consumers are better oﬀ in
the latest situation. A step backwards to the general speciﬁcation of Type 1
equilibrium is necessary at this stage and its description is provided.































































2 − (2θ − 1)c]=0
and: θ>ψ (b).






















1 =( b − 1)x00
2 and x00
2 > 1 is the solution to (3) as θ<φ (b).
Proposition 7 states the relations between non-linear and linear pricing equi-
librium:



















LP ∀x ∈ [0,1]
Proof Point 1. derives by simply observing that x∗
1 and x0
1 are identiﬁed
by the same ﬁrst order condition: this, in turn, implies they coincide. Point
2. and 3. are direct implications of the result in 1. while 4. is the result
of direct comparison between the equilibrium expressions of the consumers’
surplus under non-linear and linear pricing. Q.E.D.
This is a general and strong result: equation (9) allows to conclude that
the marginal customer choosing to consume one unit is the same under non-
linear and linear pricing. This obviously implies that the total output is
always larger under non-linear pricing, under which both one and two unit
packets are supplied. Moreover and more importantly, not only ﬁrms’ proﬁts
but also consumers’ surplus are always higher under non-linear pricing in this
case.
These conclusions are the exact generalization of Proposition 6 in Cheung-
Wang[4], that proves to be robust to the extension involving size economies.
As the authors recall, the result stated parallels a very well known result
concerning third degree price discrimination: this practice can be welfare
enhancing in situations in which it allows to serve a share of demand that
would stay out of the market if a uniform price were practiced.
38